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DECLARATION CONCERNING PROFESSIONAL ETHICS RECENTLY
ADOPTED BY THE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT.
On February 7th, 191o, the State Bar Association of Connecti-
cut, at its annual meeting, unanimously adopted the report of its
special committee on the adoption of a Code of Professional
Ethics. This action is in step with a general movement in the
several States throughout the country, and with the action of the
American Bar Association at Seattle in 1908.
Codes of this nature, setting forth in express terms those
ethical principles which should guide those who practice law, are-
not a novelty. Indeed, such formal statements are adopted in
many professions, and are, in the main, declaratory of such
principles of dealings between practitioners, and with the out-
side world, as are instinctive to men of the greatest experience,
the soundest wisdom, and the highest moral sense. If all men
were endowed with these qualities at the beginning of their pro-
fessional lives, such codes would be of little value, save to indi-
cate to the outside world what standards prevail within the pro-
fession, and thereby enhance the confidence in and respect for
those who conform to these requirements, and are in good stand-
ing in their respective professions.
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Unfortunately, however, this is not the case, and many young
men come to the Bar lacking the benefits of sound home, social
and religious training. Sometimes-though rarely-in such men
we find a strong innate sense of right, and of consideration for
others, with whom all that may be found in a code of ethics
would be intuitive.
The great majority of men-even those who have enjoyed the
benefits of the highest training-need, from time to time, to be
reminded of the rules, and to measure their purposes and their
conduct by them. We might even go further and say that the
best and wisest of men are helped by perusing a code in which
their highest professional ideals are imbedded.
Many a young man goes astray in professional life, and makes
professional mistakes, even though he avoids the grosser tempta-
tions. Ignorance is no excuse where such codes as this, if con-
sulted, will furnish a principle for nearly every conceivable case.
The American Bar Association has been at work on this sub-
ject for years, and its work has been most thorough, intelligent
and painstaking. Its committees were made up of some of the
most eminent men of the country, and they studied their subject
for years. Tentative codes were drafted, from time to time, and
submitted to a large number of judges and lawyers, and their
opinions were finally published in a large volume for final use in
drafting the code. This code has, since its adoption, been, in
many different ways, presented to the public and the profession,
and is readily accessible. It was at first thought that this code
might well be adopted in every State of the Union without alter-
ation, and that in this way another long step in the direction of
uniformity in the law might be taken. To the Connecticut com-
mittee, however, of which Judge Hamersley, lately of the Su-
preme Court, was the head, it seemed that in some minor re-
spects the code was not in strict conformity with our profes-
sional ideas. It seemed, also, that questions of mere professional
courtesy and etiquette might well be separated from the more
serious questions involving moral obliquity; and it further seemed
that a slight change in arrangement might be of advantage.
The Connecticut code, however, in no essential respect differs-
save by some omissions-from that of the American Bar Asso-
ciation. Indeed, the Committee says: "We have included in the
draft substantially all the Canons of the American Bar Associa-
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tion, using for the most part the same language; and have
grouped under separate headings the more distinctly ethical rules,
the rules of professional etiquette, and those affecting the lawyer
in his relation to the public." The code reported by the Commit-
tee consists of a preamble, and a "Declaration Concerning Pro-
fessional Ethics," which are set forth in twelve pages. A copy
of the report has been sent to each member of the Connecticut
Bar, whether or not a member of the Association, and copies may
be had through the Secretary of the Yale Law School.
The interesting and instructive article in the last number of
this JOURNAL by Dean James B. Brooks, of the College of Law,
Syracuse University, is well timed, and especially in view of the
suggestion of the committee that the rules of Court or the regu-
lations of the State Bar Examining Committee be modified
"for the purpose of securing an adequate understanding by those
admitted to the Bar of the principles and recognized rules of
professional ethics." How this understanding shall be evidenced
has not yet been determined.'
That the students at this school have enjoyed lectures on legal
ethics, from a most eminent authority on the subject, is a matter
for congratulation, but it is plain that to the men who most need
this instruction something more than a lecture course is requisite,
and that the rules should be before them, in tangible form, to be
read and mastered. Whether or not such action be taken by the
School, or the Examining Committee, no man can afford to
enter, or to remain a member of, the Bar of any State, without
familiarizing himself with those rules, regulations and require-
ments which the highest ideals of the profession demand. That
these standards are lofty is true; that they cannot be attained at
all times by any man throughout his professional career may be
true; but it is none the less true that none but the highest con-
ceivable standards should satisfy our profession, and that every
man should strive toward them with what strength he has.
G.D. W.
1 Since this note was written, the State Bar Examining Committee of
Connecticut, at a special session, has taken action in this matter, and will
require-beginning at the June examination, 19ii-an examination on the
Connecticut "Declaration Concerning Professional Ethics" referred to
above; the Connecticut Attorney's Oath; and Sharswood's "Legal Ethics."
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LIABILITY TO A BONA FIDE PURCHASER ON A STOLEN CHECK.
In Capital City Bank v. Huffman (date of decision not re-
ported), the Intermediate Court of Marion County, West Vir-
ginia, handed down a decision of more than usual interest. The
facts, briefly stated, were as follows: The defendant gave to his
brother a number of checks on the E Bank signed by the de-
fendant with the payee, date and amount left blank; these checks
were to be filled up and used in the private business of the
brother; one of the checks so signed was stolen, filled up fraudu-
lently and cashed by the plaintiff without notice; the check being
sent to the E Bank for payment, it was returned marked "No
funds," and the holder sues the maker, the indorser having
absconded.
This brings up fairly the question: Is a person who signs a
blank check liable to a bona fide holder who takes the instrument
from one who has stolen it and fraudulently filled it out? The
Court says, yes. We are inclined to the belief that this decision is,
to say the least, open to doubt.
We have been unable to find any case directly bearing on this
subject. The various possibilities arising from the delivery of a
blank instrument to an agent have practically all been in the
Courts except this one. So, we can only base our conclusions on
analogies. When a blank instrument is delivered to an agent (I)
he may fill it out and use it as directed; or (2) he may fill in the
blanks with a sum in excess of his authority; or (3) he may fill it
out with the authorized sum, but be negligent in so doing so that
it may be changed; or (4) it may escape from his possession while
still incomplete.
It is evident that, by the rules of agency, if he fills it out as
directed, the principal will be liable on the instrument as com-
pleted. And it has been repeatedly held that if he fills it out in
excess of his authority the principal will be held. This is on the
ground of implied authority. Tiedman Commercial Paper,
Sect. 283; Bigelow., Estoppel, 495. See also Russell v. Lang-
staff, 2 Dougla 514, where Lord Mansfield said: "The indorse-
ment on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum."
On the next possibility the authorities are not entirely in ac-
cord. The earliest case on this subject is the English case of
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253. An agent, in filling out a check,
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left blanks in such a way that the amount of the check could easily
be changed. This was done and the drawer was held liable to
his banker for the amount so paid out. The Court bases the deci-
sion on the express grounds of negligence. This case has been
criticised by the later cases in England and in this country, and
the rule as to leaving blanks in an instrument is now the other
way. The fact that spaces were so left in an instrument is not
evidence of negligence on the part of an indorser and he cannot
be held where they are fraudulently filled up. Scholfield v.
Loudesborough (1895), I Q. B. 536. In this case, the Court
says that the forgery, and not the negligence, was the proximate
cause of the injury, and refers to Young v. Grote as the "fount
of bad argument." A recent case in New York reviews the au-
thorities and reaches the conclusion that the weight of the Amer-
ican decisions is in favor of the later English cases, and that the
leaving of a blank space is not evidence of negligence. The Court
says that the only theory upon which the indorser could be held
to be liable (and this would apply with equal force to a maker)
is that "he is bound to assume that those to whom he delivers
the paper or into whose hands it may come, will be likely to com-
mit a crime if it is comparatively easy to do so. I deny that there
is any such presumption in the law." National Exchange Bank
of Albany v. Lester, 194 N. Y. 461. And see the note to this
case in 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 402, where the authorities are col-
lected and discussed. The conclusion reached in this note is to
the effect that Bank v. Lester states the law as supported by the
weight of authority. So we can say that" the general rule is that,
in our third proposition, the principal cannot be held.
Coming now to the situation where the incomplete instrument
has escaped from the custody of the agent and has been fraudu-
lently filled up. This might occur either through his negligence
or independent of any want of care on his part. And in the case
of a check it might lead to a fraud either on the drawee bank or on
a bona fide holder.
It has been held that where a blank check has been stolen
and filled up by an unauthorized person, if this check is paid by
the drawee bank, the drawer is liable to the bank. But this is be-
cause of the peculiar relation of banker and depositor. Snodgrass
v. Sweetzer 15 Ind. App. 682; Trust Company of Amcrica v.
Conklin, ii N. Y. Supp. 367. The bank is compelled to know
the signature of its depositor, and if it is satisfied that the signa-
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ture is good, it need look no further. The fact that the body of
the check is in different handwriting is no notice of irregularity.
See Daniel Negotiable Instruinents, Sect. 1o54a, and cases cited.
The question of the liability to a bona fide holder of an instru-
ment of this kind seems to have been a favorite subject of dis-
cussion for a great many years, and it is surprising that it has
never been settled by the Courts. In Swan v. The North British
Australasian Company, 2 H. & C. 175, Justice Blackburn says,
by way of dictum: "It is sufficient to point out that a party sign-
ing in blank, a check or other negotiable instrument, does in-
tend that it shall be filled up and delivered to a series of holders.
• . .He means the holder to be induced to take the instrument
as if it had been filled up from the first." He thinks the maker
would be liable on the ground of estoppel. An eminent text-
writer expresses the view that the bona fide purchaser could re-
cover from the maker. Morse on Banks and Banking, Vol. II,
Sect. 486. The reasoning whereby he reaches this conclusion is
not set forth, however.
In Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45, the defendants indorsed sev-
eral blank notes and left them with their clerk, from whom the
note in suit was obtained by fraud, and filled out. It reached the
hands of a bona fide holder and he was allowed to recover. But
in that case the clerk was guilty of negligence.
In Ba-endale v. Bennett, 47 L. J. Q. B. 624, the defendant had
signed a bill of exchange as acceptor. The name of the drawer
had been left blank, and the bill was, in this condition, stolen from
his desk. A drawer's name was forged and the bill came into the
hands of a bona fide purchaser. The Court held that the de-
fendant was not liable, even though he might have been negligent
in leaving the note lying around in this incomplete condition, be-
cause this negligence was not the proximate cause of fraud.
Tedwick v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307, is to the same effect. Lord
Justice Bramwell, in Baxcndale v. Bennett, supra, expresses his
opinion, by dictum, that the bona fide holder of a check that had
been signed in blank and stolen could not recover.
In Trust Co. of America v. Conklin, supra, the Court says:
"We may for the purposes of this appeal dismiss entirely the
question whether the defendant would be liable to a bona fide
holder for value. The question before us is entirely one con-
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cerning the duties of a depositor to his bank. That a depositor
owes a real duty to the bank has been frequently decided, and
this duty is greater than that which the maker of an instrument
owes to subsequent holders for value. A purchaser of a nego-
tiable instrument can take it or not at his option, and usually, at
least to some extent, relies on the responsibility of the last holder.
A bank, however, mutst at its peril pay out the money deposited,
if the depositor directs him to do so. . . . If the defendant is
liable at all, it is because he owed the bank a duty which he
violated by signing the check in blank."
Under the doctrines laid down by these decisions, it would seem
that the mere act of delivering the blank check to the agent was
not negligence per se. "There can be no negligence where there is
no duty." Bank v. Lester, supra. According to the theory ex-
pressed in that and other cases cited, the maker need not presume
that somebody will fill up these checks fraudulently or criminally.
Hence, there can be no duty on him which would forbid the de-
livery of the checks to the agent. The theft and forgery was the
proximate cause of the fraud, and he need not foresee that as
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser. In the case of a check
more than any other instrument, the taker relies on the credit of
the last holder and assumes the risk of a forgery or other irregu-
larity in the check. Circumstances might arise where negligence
could be shown on the part of the agent in allowing the checks
to escape from his custody, and in this case the holder might
recover as in Putnam v. Sullivan, supra; but, in the absence of
such circumstances, we are inclined to think that the maker would
not be liable.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS IN CASES OF INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY.
A railroad car containing nitroglycerine exploded in Kentucky
near the boundary line between that State and Tennessee and de-
stroyed property in both States..A property owner in Tennessee
sued for damages in the Kentucky County Circuit Court. That
Court dismissed the action on the ground that it was a local action
and must be brought in the jurisdiction in which the injured prop-
erty is situated. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, re-
versed the County Court and held that the action was main-
tainable, notwithstanding the fact that the injured property was
without its jurisdiction. Smith v. Southern Ry. Company, 123
YALE LAW JOURNAL
S. W. 678. The Court of Appeals held that since the explosion
in Kentucky, caused by the negligence of the defendant, instan-
taneously destroyed the house of the plaintiff situated only a few
yards away, in Tennessee, the action could be maintained in either
State.
This is the first case of its kind in Kentucky and it seems that
there are very few similar cases in the country. Consequently
it cannot be said that there is any weight of authority on the sub-
ject, though many courts are inclined to adhere strictly to the
common law distinctions between local and transitory actions.
That the wrongdoer may be sued where the injured property
is situated is well settled, even though the cause of the injury
arises in another county. Thompson v. Crocker, 9 Pick (Mass.)
6i. And the action may be maintained even when part of the
plaintiff's land lies in the same State in which the cause of the
injury existed. Ruckman v. Green, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 225. Where
a nuisance extends from one jurisdiction into another, a Court
of Equity within whose jurisdiction the nuisance exists will
grant relief by injunction. Stilinan v. White Rock Mfg. Co., Fed.
Cas. No. 13,446.
At one time Lord Mansfield and Lord Chief Justice Eyre
allowed suits at law to be maintained in England for injuries
done by pulling down houses in Nova Scotia and Labrador, but
the doctrine has since been overruled as untenable. Story on
Conflict of Laws, p. 772. The earlier weight of authority in
this country seems to have been that all actions for injuries to
real property were local and had to be brought in the jurisdiction
where the injured property was situated, even though the cause
of the injury was elsewhere. Eachus v. Trustees of Ill. and Mich.
Canal, 17 Ill. 534; Howard v. Ingersoll, 23 Ala. 673; Watts v.
Kinney, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 82.
The Kentucky Court cites as one of its strongest authorities
Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio St. 489, which is a curious evidence
as to the basis upon which judicial legislation is sometimes found-
ed. In that case the cause of the injury was in Pennsylvania, and
the plaintiff, whose property was situated wholly in Ohio, was
allowed to maintain his action in Ohio under the authority of
Eachus v. Trustees, etc., and Watts v. Kinney, supra. The Ohio
Court then went one step further and said that the action could
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be maintained in either State, citing for its only authority,
Chitty, Pleading 299, which has also been cited in nearly every
other case on this point. The only case that Chitty cites to uphold
his assertion that the venue may be laid ;n either jurisdiction is
Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29, which does not sustain him at all
for the reporter drew up his syllabus from the arguments of the
attorneys instead of from the decision of the Court. Consequently
the Ohio Court practically cited nothing to sustain its statement
which, after all, was mere obiter dictum.
Notwithstanding this lack of solid foundation, the doctrine
laid down in Chitty, and followed in the case at hand, seems to
have become a settled doctrine so far, as it refers to counties.
Barden v. Crocker, io Pick. (Mass.) 383; Pilgrim v. Mellor, i
Ill. App. 448; Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Combs, 43 Ill. App. 119.
There is yet the question whether this doctrine can be applied
to sovereign states. So far as we can ascertain there are only
two other cases in this country, besides the present case, which
bear directly on this point. In Rundle v. Delaware, etc., Canal,
I Wall. Jr. (U.S. C. C.) 275, the defendant's dam in New Jersey
injured the plaintiff's property in Pennsylvania, and it was held
that the action could be maintained in the Circuit Court of the
United States in New Jersey, because the State of New Jersey
"formed one county" so far as that Court was concerned. The
Texas Court quoted the U. S. Circuit Court in Armendia.r v. Still-
man, 54 Texas 623, where an action was brought in Texas for
injury to land in Mexico caused by a dam in Texas, but the
court decided the case ol the ground that the common law had
been superseded in Texas by statute and therefore the action was
maintainable. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall it said further that
without legislative aid the Courts have applied the "fiction upon
which transitory actions are sustained" to personal torts wherever
the wrong may have been committed, and to all contracts wher-
ever executed. To this general rule, contracts respecting lands
form no exception, and, though an investigation of the title may
be necessary or a question of boundary arise, yet these difficul-
ties have not prevailed against the jurisdiction of the court.
Therefore, in view of these two decisions, and the fact that
there seems to be no great distinction between the comparative
jurisdictions of States and Counties, the Kentucky Court should
be commended for its decision even though it may seem to be con-
trary to the old common law doctrine regarding local actions.
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MAN DAMUS COMMANDING INSPECTORS OF ELECTIONS TO COUNT
VOTES EXCLUDED BY MISUNDERSTANDING OF ELECTION LAW.
In the recent case of the People of New York ex rel. McLaugh-
lin v. Ammenwerth, et al., N. Y. Law J., Vol. 42, No. 103, the
Court of Appeals of New York passed upon a point never before
decided by that Court and one upon which there appear to be
few decisions. The case arose out of the general election of
last November for the office of Municipal Court Justice of the
Fourth District. After the conclusion of the election, the in-
spectors canvassed the votes and filed their certificate, as re-
quired by law, in the Clerk's office of the County of Queens. Sev-
enteen ballots were protested as being marked for identification
and, as required by statute, were so indorsed by the canvassers
and placed in a sealed envelope and deposited as required by law.
Under the terms of the statute, the inspectors should have counted
these ballots leaving their validity to be thereafter determined in
a special proceeding taken for the purpose. Acting under a
misunderstanding of this election law, however, the canvassers
did not count thest ballots. This action was brought for a per-
emptory writ of mandamus directing them to canvass the pro-
tested ballots and after the canvass to correct their returns in
conformity with the result of such canvass. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the order granting the mandamus by a vote of five
to two.
Where inspectors and judges of elections have wholly failed
or refused to perform their duties in counting the ballots and mak-
ing returns in acordance with the statute requirements, there
is no doubt of the right of the courts to issue a peremptory writ
of mandamus ordering them to convene and fulfill the duties of
their offices. People ex rel. Sturtevant v. Armstrong, 116 N. Y.
App. Div. lo9; People ex rel. Smith v. Schiellein, 95 N. Y. 124;
Taylor et al. v. Kolb, ioo Ala. 603.
On the other hand, mandamus will not lie, at least in New York,
to order an entire recount of the ballots already counted by the in-
spectors. Hearst v. Woelper, 183 N. Y. 284; Corbett v. Naylor,
25 R. I. 52o. It is a settled principle of the New York Court that
the results of an election should be speedily ascertained, the re-
sult declared, and certificates of elections upon such declared re-
sults issued to those persons who, upon the face of the returns,
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have been elected to public office. People ex rel. Brink v. Way,
179 N. Y. 174.
The greatest number of cases arise under some variety of
circumstance like that in the principal case where the can-
vassing board has incompletely discharged its duties, either
through error or fraud on their part. Considerable difference
seems to exist among the various states as to when a mandamus
will be granted to compel a board to convene and correct their
error.
Some cases have held that when the board has filed its certifi-
cate and has dissolved, the matter is wholly out of their jurisdic-
tion and they have become functus officio, and despite whatever
errors they may have committed, mandamus will not lie to com-
pel them to correct them. If the board has erred the errors must
be corrected by some other tribunal, usually in a quo warranto
proceeding. The office is already filled by a person holding by
color of right. State ex rel. Bland v. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256; Peo-
ple v. Supervisors of Greene, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 217. On the
holding in this latter case, Chief Justice Cullen bases his dissent
in the principal case, holding that after an election return has once
been made, the same cannot be altered, but the only remedy for
error or fraud must be found in quo warranto. It appears, how-
ever, that neither the decisions of the Court of Appeals of New
York nor those of many other jurisdictions justify this expression
of opinion as the generally accepted rule.
In re Stewart, 155 N. Y. 545, where the New York Court per-
haps showed its greatest liberality in granting a mandamus, the
Court said: "The theory of a proceeding asking for a per-
emptory writ of mandamus requiring the inspectors of elections
in the districts named to convene and make correct returns of
the vote cast in such districts for said officers, is that, insomuch
as the inspectors have through error or otherwise made a false
return contrary to their duties under the law, the Court must
intervene and authorize, and, if need be, compel them to make
a true return. This is wholly independent of the IElection Law
itself and rests upon the fundamental and elemental principle
that every public officer can be compelled by the Court to per-
form the duties pertaining to his office."
In many other jurisdictions the Courts have shown a willing-
ness to grant mandamus when canvassing boards incompletely
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discharge their duties. In People v. Nordheim, 99 Ill 553, the
Illinois Court held that functus officio does not take effect when
canvassing boards have dispersed before having completed the
canvass. The office of canvassers being largely ministerial, they
will be required to count all the votes and will not be allowed to
disfranchise voters by failure to count certain votes through some
informality which can be corrected before the canvassers. People
ex rel. Fuller v. Hilliard, 29 Ill. 413.
In re Strong, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 484, the Massachusetts Court
said: "Generally in all cases of omissions or mistakes where
there is no other adequate. specific remedy, resort may be had to
mandamus." A board of canvassers had refused to give a certi-
ficate of election to an officer elected and had ordered a new
election. Mandamus was held to lie to compel the board to give
the certificate although the Court admitted that People v. New
York, 3 Johns Cas. 79, was contra. And it could hardly be main-
tained that the above statement by the Massachusetts Court
could be reconciled with the statement of the Rhode Island Court
in Corbett v. Naylor, supra, where that Court said: "The func-
tion of a mandamus is to compel the performance of a legal duty,
to command action, not to review action. It does not lie to cor-
rect mistakes that have been made or to remedy wrongs that
have been done or to undo that which has been done." The rea-
soning in this case agrees somewhat with that of the dissenting
justices in the principal case and shows a desire to draw a sharp
distinction in legal effect between completing their unfinished
duties and correcting the erroneous performance of their duties as
a justification for granting a mandamus writ.
A similar decision was reached in Kisder v. Cameron, 39 Ind.
488, where the Court authorized a mandamus to compel a board
of canvassers to give a certificate to a party elected.
Unless the ballots have been returned to the county clerk and
are beyond the control of the board, the Nebraska Courts will
issue a mandamus to compel the canvassers who neglect or
refuse to fully perform their duty, to discharge that duty. State
v. Dinsmore, 5 Brown (Neb.) 145; State ex rel. Waggoner v.
Russel, 34 Neb. 116.
In Kummel v. Dealy, 112 Ia. 503, the board of supervisors
failed to properly certify and authenticate and refused to permit
the judges, who appeared before them at the same session, to cor-
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rect any errors. It was held that mandamus would lie to compel
the board to permit such correction since it was the only remedy
available to complainant voters.
A case clearly opposed to the rule of The People v. Supervisors
of Greene, supra, is State v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55, where the can-
vassing board had met and made its canvass of all the returns
of the election which had been received by them on the legal day
for proceeding with the canvass, yet, afterwards, other and fur-
ther returns of the election were received by them, but the board
adjourned without including these latter returns in the canvass.
A mandamus would have been granted requiring the board to
reassemble and complete the canvass of all the returns in their
possession but for the fact that the statute had been repealed
under which they exercised their authority as canvassers. And
in State v. McCoy, 2 Mary. (Del.) 576, it was held that the deci-
sion of the Florida Court could not be accepted as the law in
that jurisdiction and granted a writ of mandamus to compel the
canvassers to reassemble when the board of canvassers had failed
to properly count the vote, although that portion of the election
law under which the board had exercised their authority had been
repealed and other officials had been constituted a new board in
their place.
It must be remembered that a proceeding tinder the writ of
mandamus does not necessarily determine the ultimate right.
Thus, it has been applied when it could determine but one step
in the progress of inquiry and when it could not finally settle the
controversy, but it might be necessary to resort to quo warranto,
an injunction, or a contest of election under the statute. Ex
parte Strong, supra; People v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 492.
From these decisions it would appear that the rule laid down
in the principal case was in line with the weight of authority
in granting a peremptory writ of mandamus for the purpose of
compelling the inspectors of elections to conform to all the pro-
visions of the Election Law in counting the votes.
